Hey there, cyber friends! I’m back, and today I got something that made me raise my eyebrows, you know? Like when the cafecito is a little too strong, but in a good way… mostly.
So, I was reading this article on SecurityWeek, a place I go to for my security news, and it seems some smart people, researchers they call them, found something pretty interesting. They are saying that maybe, just maybe, up to a quarter that’s 25%, mi gente! of all the Industrial Control Systems, the ICS, that we see connected to the internet… well, they might not be the real deal.
You hear me? Not real! Like a plastic banana, you know? They look like an ICS, they smell (on the network, of course) like an ICS, but they are what we call honeypots.
Now, for those not in the know, a honeypot is like a trap. It’s a system that cybersecurity folks, the good guys, or researchers set up. They make it look like a juicy target, like a vulnerable PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) or an HMI (Human Machine Interface) for a power plant or a factory. The idea is to attract the bad guys, the hackers, the ciberdelincuentes. When they try to mess with the honeypot, we can study their tools, their methods, how they try to break in. It’s like fishing, but instead of pescado, you catch a cyber crook’s techniques.
So, this new research is telling us that a big chunk of what we thought were real, operational ICS systems controlling important things like water, electricity, manufacturing might actually be these decoys. This is a big deal, oye!
Why is it a big deal, you ask? Well, for years, we’ve been looking at these internet scans, you know, tools like Shodan or Censys, and seeing all these ICS exposed. And we’d say, “Ay Dios mío! Look at all these vulnerable systems! This is a disaster waiting to happen!” And yes, many are real and are a problem, a gran problema.
But if up to 25% are honeypots, it means our picture of the actual, real world exposure of critical infrastructure might be a little… how you say… skewed? Inflated? Like when you think you have a full tank of gas, but the gauge is a bit loco.
This finding has implications, and that’s a fancy word for consequences, for how we understand the data. It doesn’t mean there are no real ICS exposed, claro que no. There are still too many. But it does mean that when we see a number, we have to be a bit more careful. We need to think, “Okay, how much of this is genuine risk, and how much is… well, research and defense in action?”
It’s a little refreshing, in a way. It shows that the cybersecurity community is actively working, setting up these traps to learn and to protect. It’s not all doom and gloom, you see?
But it also means we need better ways to tell the difference. When we are scanning the internet for these critical systems, we need to be smarter to know if it’s a real fábrica controller or just a clever honeypot looking to catch a pescao feo. The researchers who did this study are probably thinking about that too. How do we refine our tools and our analysis?
So, next time you see a scary headline about thousands of exposed ICS, take a breath. Remember this. It’s still serious, very serious. We need to protect our critical infrastructure, sin duda. But maybe, just maybe, a part of what we are seeing is the good guys looking back at the bad guys.
Stay safe out there, and don’t click on strange links, even if they promise free pastelitos de guayaba. ¡Hasta la próxima!

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